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THE "PROOF" OF FOREIGN
NORMATIVE FACTS WHICH
INFLUENCE DOMESTIC RULES©
FRtDtRIC BACHAND*

This article concerns the ascertainment by judges
of normative facts that emanate from within foreign legal
orders and must be taken into consideration in the
interpretation of domestic rules. The author proposes an
analytical approach which is based on three ideas. First,
judges must remain in control of the process aimed at
ascertaining such facts. Because the interpretation of
domestic rules is at stake, they cannot remain passive
and rule solely on the basis of the information adduced
by the parties, as they normally do while ascertaining the
contents of foreign rules under a classic conflict of laws
scenario. Second, foreign normative facts are often
reasonably disputable, and when that is the case the
parties must be afforded the opportunity to comment on
whatever information the court intends to rely on while
ascertaining the contents of such facts. Finally, the
assistance of experts may be necessary in some cases, but
full-fledged party-appointed expert testimony will rarely
be a cost-effective option. Judges and parties should
consider alternative options, such as the testimony of a
court-appointed expert orwritten statements provided by
party-appointed experts.

Cet article traite de la d6termination par les juges de
faits normatifs 6manant d'un ordre juridique 6tranger et qui
doivent 8tre pris en consid(ration dans l'interpr6tation de
r~gles internes. L'auteur propose une approche analytique
fond6e sur trois ides. D'abord, il revient aux juges de
contr6ler le processus de d6termination de ces faits: comme
I'interpr~tation de r~gles internes est en cause, ils ne peuvent
demeurer passifs et d6cider sur le seul fondement
d'informations fournies par les parties, comme ils le font
normalement en d6terminant le contenu de r~gles trangres
applicables au fond du litige. Ensuite, les faits normatifs
6trangers peuvent souvent 8tre l'objet de d6bats entre
personnes raisonnables, et lorsque c'est le cas les parties
doivent avoir ]'occasion de faire valoir leur point de vue au
sujet de toute information sur laquelle la cour entend
s'appuyer en dMterminant de tels faits. Enfin, lintervention
d'experts peut s'av6rer n6cessaire dans certains cas, mais
puisque le t6moignage d'experts nomm6s par les parties
s'av6rera rarement efficient, lesjuges et les parties devraient
considrer certaines alternatives, comane le t6moignage d'un
expert nomrn6 par la cour ou le recours A des opinions
6crites produites par des experts nomm6s par les parties.
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INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUE IN CONTEXT

Canadian legal orders have become more and more permeable to
normative facts1 that emanate from foreign legal orders and that have the
possibility of influencing the interpretation of domestic rules. This
phenomenon firstly results from increasingly frequent statutory provisions
that incorporate such facts in an explicit manner.2 But it also results from
the abandonment by the Supreme Court of Canada of traditional
conceptions of what constitute sources of law, namely constitutional texts,
statutes, local precedents, and statutory instruments in force in the legal
order in which a judge is sitting. Nowadays, Canadian courts must also take
"context" into consideration 3 and despite persistent uncertainties regarding
its scope and its relationship with traditional sources of law, it clearly
extends beyond domestic normative facts.
1

Facts that have relevance to legal reasoning are commonly referred to as "legislative facts,"
a
concept coined by K.C. Davis in "An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process"
(1942) 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364 at 424. See also Notes of the Advisory Committee on rules relating to Rule
201 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence, online: Legal Information Institute
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/ACRule201.htm>. However, the term "legislative" is perhaps
not fully adequate because this concept of legislative facts does not only encompass facts that influence
the contents of statutory rules; it is also concerned with facts that have a bearing on all other types of
rules, such as constitutional and common law rules. Because it is broader and more generic, the term
"normative" will therefore be used in this paper.
2 See e.g. the definition of "terrorist activity" found in the CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.
83.01(1), incorporating within Canadian legal orders several offences recognized under international
law. Consider also the United NationsForeignArbitralAwards Convention Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.),
c. 16 [ForeignArbitral Awards Convention], and the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods,S.C. 1991, c. 13 [Vienna Convention on InternationalSales] which have been
enacted into domestic law by Canadian legislatures.
Regarding the Supreme Court of Canada's unambiguous adoption of E.A. Driedger's contextual
approach to statutory interpretation ("[t]oday there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words
of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament") in
E.A. Driedger, Constructionof Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87, see e.g. Re Rizzo
& Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at 41; R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at 704; Winters v. Legal
Services Society, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 160 at 181; Francis v. Baker, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250 at 267; R. v. Davis,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 759 at 779; 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804 at 810-11; WillKare Paving& Contracting Ltd. v. Canada,[2000] 1 S.C.R. 915 at 934; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45
at 74-75; R. v. Ulybel EntreprisesLtd., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867 at 883ff; Ludco Entreprises Ltd. v. M.N.R.,
[200112 S.C.R. 1082 at 1100; Chieu v. Canada (Ministerof Citizenshipand Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R.
84 at 101ff; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnershipv. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at 580; R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 3
S.C.R. 757 at 799; HarvardCollege v. Canada(CommissionerofPatents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at 122;Barrie
Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476 at 493; C.UP.E. v. Ontario
(Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 at 593. In this respect, see Ruth Sullivan, "Statutory
Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1998-99) 30 Ottawa L. Rev. 175 at 215ff; S.M.
Sugunasiri, "Contextualism: The Supreme Court's New Standard of Justice Analysis and
Accountability" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 126.
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The most prominent of these foreign normative facts are surely
Canada's international obligations. As actors in the international legal
order, judges and legislatures are increasingly conscious of their own
responsibilities to promote adherence to the rule of law in international
relations.' Judges are also increasingly conscious of the specificity of
international rules, as they have acknowledged-absent any legislative
directive to that effect-the need to interpret Canada's treaty obligations
in light of international rules of interpretation 5 that require consideration
of various normative facts, such as the different versions of the travaux
pr~paratoiresof the particular treaty or state practice.6
However, the growing influence of foreign normative facts in
Canadian legal orders cannot be attributed solely to a desire to promote
adherence to the rule of law on the international plane. Take, for example,
the Supreme Court's decision in Ordon Estate v. Grail, affirming that the
interpretation and development of common law rules in maritime matters
must include a consideration of the desire to harmonize rules in
jurisdictions involved in maritime trade. 7 The Court's well-known decision
in Baker v. Canada is another example. In that case, a treaty to which
Canada is a party but which has not been explicitly implemented by
Canadian legislatures, was considered not for the purpose of ensuring
compliance with international obligations, but rather because it was held to

See e.g. National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R.
1324
(abandoning the idea that Canada's relevant international obligations could only be taken into
consideration when a statute is intrinsically ambiguous); Pushpanathanv. Canada(MinisterofCitizenship
and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 at 1019 [Pushpanathan] (affirming that legislation must be
interpreted in conformitywith Canada's international obligations under a treaty that has been explicitly
implemented within domestic legal orders); Canadian Foundationfor Children, Youth and the Law v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.R. 86 at 100 ("[sltatutes should be construed to comply with
Canada's international obligations"); William A. Schabas, "Twenty-Five Years of Public International
Law at the Supreme Court of Canada" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 174.
See e.g. R. v. Parisien,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 950; Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551 [Thomson];
Crown ForestIndustries Ltd. v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 802; Pushpanathan,ibid.
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37, arts. 31-32
[Vienna Convention on Treaties]. For relevant precedents emanating from national courts claiming that
state practice should be taken into consideration in the interpretation of international treaty obligations,
see M. Roth & R. Happ, "Interpretation of Uniform Law Instruments According to Principles of
International Law" [1997] Unif. L. Rev. 700; R. Gardiner, "Treaty Interpretation in English Courts Antwerp United Diamond v. Air Europe" [1994] L.M.C.L.Q. 184. For an example of a decision of the
Supreme Court where foreign cases were considered in the interpretation of legislation implementing
an international treaty to which Canada is a party, see Canada (A.G.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689
[Ward].
7 [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 at 495.
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reflect certain values that ought to influence domestic law.8 Other examples
are found in statutory provisions such as those requiring that judges give
regard to the travaux priparatoires of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
InternationalCommercialArbitrationwhen interpreting domestic statutes
incorporating the Model Law.9 In such cases, the integration of foreign
normative facts reflects a desire to harmonize specific categories of rules
that are considered to belong to normative systems that extend beyond
local borders.
The increased influence of these foreign normative facts raises
several important questions. Surely, it makes sense in 2005 to expect that
judges do not completely ignore Canada's international obligations when
they interpret domestic rules. How large a role, however, should these
obligations play? Should we expect judges to consider treaty obligations
even when the relevant treaty has not been implemented through domestic
legislation? Classic doctrine would hold this to be contrary to the
fundamental principles of democracy and federalism. 0 But it may make

more sense, given the strength of Canada's commitment to international
relations based on the rule of law, to require that judges do give regard to
these obligations.t Perhaps democracy and federalism would not be unduly
8 [19991 2 S.C.R. 817 [Baker]. For another example of the Court relying on international
instruments as reflections of global values that need to be taken into consideration in the interpretation
of domestic rules, see United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. A parallel can be drawn between this
aspect of the Court's recent jurisprudence and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision striking down a Texas
statute banning same-sex sodomy among consenting adults. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 at 576
(2003) [Lawrence], in which a majority ofjustices clearly affirmed that values receiving substantial global
support ought to be taken into consideration while interpreting the U.S. Constitution: "To the extent
Bowers [an earlier decision being overruled] relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should
be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers has been rejected elsewhere. See also Roper v.
Simmons, No. 03-633 (U.S. March 1, 2005). The European Court of Human Rights has followed not
Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P. G. & J. H. v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 00044787/98, P 56 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993);
Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1988). Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. See
Brief for Mary Robinson et al. asAmici Curiaeat 11-12, Lawrence. The right the petitioners seek in this
case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow
more legitimate or urgent." On this and other U.S. developments, see John K. Setear, "A Forest With
No Trees: The Supreme Court and International Law in the 2003-2004 Term" (4 October 2004), online:
Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=600043>.
See e.g. Qufbec's Code of Civil Procedure,Art. 940.6 C.C.P. [Code of Civil
Procedure].
See e.g. lacobucci J.'s reasons in Baker, supra note 8.
11 See e.g. Rahaman v. Canada (Ministerof Citizenshipand Immigration), [2002] 3
F.C. 537 at 558
(C.A.). See generally R. Provost, "Le juge mondialis: 16gitimit6 judiciaire et droit international au
Canada" in Marie-Claire Belleau & Francois Lacasse, eds., ClaireL'Heureux-Dubeat the Supreme Court
of Canada- 1987-2002 (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004) 569.
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marginalized, as legislatures could always have the last word by enacting
legislation discarding an internationalist interpretation considered to be
inappropriate; the balance would merely be tilted further toward the
promotion of the rule of law on the international plane.
One could also ask what weight judges should give to Canada's
international obligations when they interpret constitutional rules. The idea
that international human rights obligations ought to be considered in the
2
interpretation of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms1 makes, of
course, a lot of sense. But should they be afforded as much weight as they
are currently given in the interpretation of statutory or common law rules?
Some may have understandable reservations; there is a very real risk that
reliance on what essentially are compromises between sovereign states will
against state power to which individuals are
unduly restrict the protection
13
entitled in Canada.
This article, however, addresses a different question: the "proof'
of foreign normative facts. It is concerned with the manner in which judges
should ascertain such facts. To speak of the proof of foreign normative facts
seems appropriate at first glance, given the widely-accepted view that legal
sources fall within the ambit of the law of evidence. 4 On second thought,
however, it may make more sense to abandon the concept of "proof' in this
context in order to clearly emphasize the theoretical distinction between
the ascertainment of adjudicative facts-who did what, when, where, how,
et cetera-and the ascertainment of facts that influence the contents of the
applicable rules. Arguably, the latter ought to be thought of as relating to
legal interpretation rather than to the law of evidence.' 5
Accordingly, one must give thought to the manner in which foreign
normative facts ought to be handled in adjudicative proceedings and, more
particularly, to the role judges should play in ascertaining these facts. It is
12

Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.

13 See Bastarache J.'s reasons in R. v. Cook, [199812 S.C.R. 597 at 677-78. See also Anne Warner
La Forest, "Domestic Application of International Law in CharterCases: Are We There Yet?" (2004)
37 U.B.C.L. Rev. 157 at 211ff.
14 It is commonly accepted that proof must be made of some domestic sources not covered by the
doctrine of judicial notice as well as sources relating to foreign rules applicable in light of relevant
conflict of laws rules. See e.g. David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999) at 294; J.W. Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence, 5th ed. (St. Paul: West
Group, 1999) vol. 2 at 395.
15 Another option is to consider that the ascertainment of such facts relates to procedural law, as
is the case in the United States since the adoption of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Hans W.
Baade, "Proving Foreign and International Law in Domestic Tribunals" (1978) 18 Va. J. Int'l L. 619 at
625. See also FED. R. EVID. 201,28 U.S.C. app. (2000) [FederalRules of Evidence] which provides for
the judicial notice of certain adjudicative facts, but where no mention is made of normative facts.
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initially tempting to favour one of the two possible approaches to be
discussed in Part II. These approaches immediately spring to mind because
they are well-known and widely resorted to in the ascertainment of foreign
and domestic rules respectively. However, as Part II demonstrates, neither
approach seems adequate in the context of foreign normative facts bearing
upon the content of domestic rules. As such, Part III proposes an
alternative approach that seeks to strike a balance between the liberty
judges must have while interpreting domestic rules and basic requirements
of procedural fairness mandating that the parties have an opportunity to
comment on any information on which the decision will be based.
II.

TWO UNSATISFACTORY APPROACHES TO HANDLING
FOREIGN NORMATIVE FACTS IN ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

A.

The IgnorantJudge

The "ignorant judge" approach rests on two basic ideas. The first
is that judges have no knowledge-and cannot be expected to have any
knowledge-of foreign normative facts they may be required to take into
consideration. The second is that judges should not enquire about such
facts on their own. Rather, the ascertainment of foreign normative facts
should be party-led and judges should, as a general rule, be bound by the
parties' initiatives; they should normally limit themselves to drawing
conclusions from information adduced by the parties.
This approach naturally comes to mind because of its similarity with
the treatment traditionally afforded to foreign rules in common law
jurisdictions as well as in many civil law jurisdictions under a classic conflict
of laws scenario. Generally, foreign rules are treated as adjudicative facts,
hence the requirement for parties to plead and prove their contents before
they can have any bearing on the court's decision.16 This idea of a
correspondence between foreign rules and adjudicative facts is shaky at
best, and it does not provide a convincing explanation for similar treatment
of the two. From a substantive point of view, however, this approach does
reveal that public policy is not really concerned with the application-let
16

See Hunt v. T&Nplc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289; Richard Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts-

Pleading,Proofand Choice of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 3; Bernard Audit, Droit
internationalprivid,3rd ed. (Paris: Economica, 2000) at 237-38: "[d]u fait du rapprochement effectu6
entre la loi 6trangre et un fait, ainsi que du caract~re principalement accusatoire de la proc6dure civile,
on a traditionnellement consid6r6 que la tAche d'6tablir le contenu de la loi 6trang~re incombait aux
parties"; Brigitte Herzog, "Proof of International Law and Foreign Law Before a French Judge" (1978)
18 Va. J. Int'l L. 651.
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alone the correct application-of foreign rules to an international dispute
because conflict of laws rules should essentially be geared towards satisfying
the litigants' interests and legitimate expectations. Whether such an
approach should still prevail in a day and age when comity, understood as
"the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation"' 17 constitutes a "key
principle underlying all private international law rules"' 18 is by no means
obvious and deserves further attention from scholars and courts. 9 This
being said, treating foreign rules as facts has one important advantage: by
limiting the judge's role to drawing conclusions from information that has
been adduced by the parties, compliance with basic requirements of
procedural fairness is ensured."z
It may be, despite the central role played by comity nowadays, that
we should not be too concerned if judges do not apply-or do not apply
correctly-foreign rules to which relevant conflict of laws rules point. But
the matter is entirely different when judges are considering foreign
normative facts that influence domestic rules. The notion that "like cases
be treated alike" is a fundamental legal principle. As such, while one of the
roles of the judiciary is the resolution of disputes between private parties,
it never solely acts for the benefit of individual litigants. Its decisions have
precedent-setting value and may affect how future disputes will be

17Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) at 164. See also R. v. Spencer, [198512 S.C.R. 278 at 283;
MorguardInvestment Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 at 1096; Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC
ContainerlineN.V. (Trustees of), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 907 at 939; Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile
Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205 at 219 [SparAerospace].
18 SparAerospace,ibid. at 217.
19

In Qu6bec, courts now have the power to take judicial notice of foreign rules or to ask that proof
thereof be made. However, the litigants remain in control insofar as the application of foreign rules is
concerned because the courts' powers can only be exercised if foreign law has been pleaded. See Art.
2809 C.C.Q. Interestingly, FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, 28 U.S.C. app. (2000) [Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] provides that "[t]he court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material
or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence." This suggests that courts sometimes have an independent duty to get it right on
matters of foreign law, which would mean that at least some conflict of laws rules are mandatory. See
e.g. Twohy v. FirstNat. Bank of Chicago, 758 F. 2d 1185 at 1193 (7th Cir. 1985): "[iun determining ...
questions of [foreign] law, both trial and appellate courts are urged to research and analyze foreign law
independently." See also infra note 22. Recent developments in France also suggest that judges have
a duty to get in right on matters of foreign law: Horatia Muir Watt, Fonds de Garantie Automobile
[FGA] c. M. Manuel Mesquita,Socidtg D. & J. SportingLtd. c. Soci6td Orchape,SA & M. MarzoukAhidar
c. Mme Fatima Abahri, 4p. Ahidar, Case Comment (2003) 92 Rev. crit. dr. int. priv6 86.
20 On these requirements, see infra 9.
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resolved.2 Hence, the idea that lies at the heart of most, if not all, legal
systems is that judges should always remain firmly in control of the
interpretation of domestic rules.22 Clearly then, it would be unacceptable
that their conclusions concerning the contents of foreign normative facts
which may influence domestic rules be exclusively based on information
adduced by the parties.
B.

The Learned Judge

A second approach treats such facts in the same manner as most
domestic normative facts falling within the ambit of traditional sources of
law and does not require them to be "proved" the way disputed
adjudicative facts are. Under this second approach, judges would be
expected to either have knowledge of such facts or at least be able to
ascertain them in a reliable manner. Judges would also be free to rely on
information other than that which was adduced by the parties and debated
at trial.
This approach is also inadequate, however, because it overlooks a
significant difference that exists between foreign normative facts and most
domestic normative facts. Normally, the latter, like, for example, the text
of a statute, the reasons issued by a court in an earlier case, travaux
priparatoires, et cetera, are, from the judge's point of view, easily
ascertainable by consulting reliable sources. These facts are thus not
reasonably disputable,23 and it may for that reason make sense to assume,
21 See generally Dominique d'Ambra, L'Objet de la Fonction Juridictionnelle:Dire le Droit et
TrancherLes Litiges, t. 236, (Paris: Librairie Gfn6rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1994). See also
Jean-Guy Belley, "Une justice de la seconde modernit6: proposition de principes g6n6raux pour le
prochain Code de proc6dure civile" (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 317 at 325ff.
22 See e.g. rule 22.1 of the JointAmerican Law Institute / UNIDROIT Working Group
on Principles
and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, UNIDROIT 2003, Study LXXVI Doc. 10, online:
UNIDROIT International Institute for the Unification of Private Law <http://www.unidroit.org/
english/publications/proceedings/2003/study/76/s-76-10-e.pdf>, which, interestingly, also suggest that
the judge's responsibility should extend to foreign rules: "[t]he court is responsible for determining the
correct legal basis for its decisions, including matters determined ... [by] foreign law ... [and] may rely
on a legal basis not advanced by the parties only upon giving them the opportunity to comment."
23 But this
is not true for all domestic normative facts that need to be considered
in the
interpretative process. Social context, for example, needs to be taken into consideration by courts called
upon to interpret common law rules. See R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 at 670: "[j]udges can and
should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country."
But the contents of such normative facts are not always undisputable, and for that reason it may not be
appropriate to consider that they always fall within the ambit of the doctrine of judicial notice. To that
effect, see inter alia Danielle Pinard, "La connaissance d'office des faits sociaux en contexte
constitutionnel" (1997) 31 R.J.T. 315. For a different view, see also Ann Woolhandler, "Rethinking the
Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts" (1988) 41 Vand. L. Rev. 111.
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as we seem to do in Canada, that basic requirements of procedural fairness
should not prohibit a judge from determining freely the contents of a rule
that is exclusively influenced by domestic normative facts.24 Indeed, the
fundamental principle, referred to by civil law jurists as the principe du
contradictoire,which states that judges should never be allowed to decide
cases on the basis of information other than that which was adduced and
debated at trial, should only operate when the information at issue is
reasonably disputable. When that is not the case, there is little problem in
affording judges greater liberty, which is why the development of the
doctrine of judicial notice was possible in the common law tradition.
But while domestic normative facts are normally not reasonably
disputable, that is certainly not the case with respect to the kind of foreign
normative facts which are increasingly incorporated within domestic legal
orders. Take, for example, foreign precedents, which the U.S. Supreme
Court has declared ought to be given considerable weight in the
interpretation of international treaties.2 6 Locating them and ascertaining
their contents may not present great difficulties to an American judge if
they all emanate from within jurisdictions like Canada, the United

24 See e.g. Lo Ducharme, Prdcis de la preuve, 5th ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2001) at 24
("le tribunal n'est pas tenu de rendre jugement uniquement en fonction des moyens de droit qui sont
plaid~s devant lui; il peut faire appel . toute r~gle de droit, que les plaideurs l'aient invoqu~e ou non").
25 See e.g. Paciocco
& Stuesser, supra note 14 at 290: "[j]udges may, on their own initiative, take
judicial notice with no input from counsel." The doctrine of judicial notice is unknown in the civil law
tradition. However, it is accepted that a judge may rely on general facts that are not reasonably disputable.
See e.g.: J. Ghestin & G. Goubeaux, TraitW de droit civil - Introductiongdnirale,4th ed. (Paris: L.G.D.J.,
1994) at 629-30. The idea that it is appropriate for judges to rely on domestic normative facts that were
neither invoked at trial by the parties, nor subsequently presented to them for comments, is open to
criticism. While the contentsperse of most domestic normative facts (the words enacted by a legislature,
what a court said in an earlier case, and so on) are indeed not reasonably disputable, the conclusions
to be drawn from these facts are often uncertain and anything but beyond reasonable debate. It may
thus make more sense for judges to always give parties an opportunity to comment on domestic
normative facts which were not adduced at trial and which they intend to rely on while reaching
conclusions of law. This approach has gained ground in civil law and common law jurisdictions in recent
years. See generally John A. Jolowicz, "The Use by the Judge of his Own Knowledge (of Fact or Law
or Both) in the Formation of his Decision" in John A. Jolowicz, ed., On Civil Procedure(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000) 243 at 253-56. See also, in particular, Lord Mustill's comments in
Hoecheong Products Co. v. CaigillHongKong Ltd., [1995] 1 W.L.R. 404 at 409 (P.C.): "It does of course
happen from time to time that a Court comes to learn of a statute or authority bearing importantly on
an issue canvassed in argument but, through an oversight, not then brought forward. The Court may
wish to take the new matter into account. Before doing so, it should always ensure that the parties have
an opportunity to deal with it, either by restoring the appeal for further oral argument, or at least by
drawing attention to the materials which have come to light and inviting written submissions upon
them."
26 Air France
v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985). For an example of use by the Supreme
Court of
Canada's foreign precedents in the interpretation of an international treaty, see Ward, supra note 6.
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Kingdom, and Australia. But what if he or she is called upon to interpret
the Vienna Convention on InternationalSales, 7 which has already generated
more than a thousand judicial decisions emanating from dozens of
jurisdictions, many of which belong to different legal traditions? 28 Or, what
about the so-called "North-American insurance practice" which, according
to two fairly recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions, must be
considered in the interpretation of Qu6bec insurance law? 29 What of the
"law in force in jurisdictions involved in maritime trade"?3 °
These are all normative facts which may be reasonably disputable.
Therefore, judges should not be free to consider them if the parties have
not had a sufficient opportunity to provide comments and arguments on
them. For example, one would no doubt find it inappropriate for a judge,
seized of a motion seeking the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award, to communicate directly with the arbitrators to enquire as
to whether they have indeed failed to act impartially and then to rely on the
result of that enquiry in his or her decision.31 It would similarly be
inappropriate if the judge instead relied on relevant foreign
precedents-retrieved during the deliberation and not subsequently
submitted to the parties for comment-while determining the meaning and
scope of the public policy exception found at article V(2)(b) of the New
York Convention.32

27 UnitedNations Convention on Contractsforthe Sale of Goods, schedule to the InternationalSale
of Goods ContractsConvention Act, R.S.C. 1991, c. 13.
28
See e.g. the Pace Law School database, online: CISG Database < http:/Avww.cisg.law.pace.edu >
which contains reports of over 1100 cases from dozens of jurisdictions, and in which it is said that there
have possibly been more than double this number of rulings relevant to the interpretation of the
Convention on Contracts,supra note 2.
29 See e.g. Caissepopulairedes Deux Rives v. Socidtd d'assurancecontre l'incendie de la Vallke du
Richelieu, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 995; Chablis Textiles Inc. (Trustee of) v. London Life InsuranceCo., [1996] 1
S.C.R. 160.
30 See supra note 7.
31 This may also constitute a breach of a rule providing for the confidentiality of the deliberations
of the arbitral tribunal. See e.g. Noble China Inc. v. Lei, (1998) 42 O.R. (3d) 69; F. Bachand, Noble
China Inc. v. Lei, Case Comment (2000) 4:1 Mod. Arb. L.Q. Rep. 43. But that is of course a very
different question.
32 ForeignArbitralAwards Convention,supra note 2.
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AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: JUDICIAL AUTONOMY,

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS, AND EFFICIENT EXPERT
ASSISTANCE
The analysis so far reveals that a satisfactory approach to the
ascertainment of foreign normative facts ought to achieve a proper balance
between, on the one hand, the liberty judges must have while interpreting
domestic rules and, on the other, basic requirements of procedural fairness
mandating that the parties have an opportunity to comment on any
information on which the decision will be based. Of course, no significant
difficulty arises if the foreign normative facts at issue are not reasonably
disputable. As long as one accepts that the legitimacy of adjudication is,
generally speaking, not imperilled when judges base their decisions on
domestic normative facts that have not been debated at trial,33 there is no
reason why foreign normative facts which are not reasonably disputable
ought to be dealt with differently. For example, we should not consider that
an injustice will be suffered if a Qu6bec judge, seized of a dispute arising in
connection with an international commercial arbitration, refers, pursuant
to article 940.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,to the travauxpriparatoires

of the
trial.34

UNCITRAL

Model Arbitration Law, even if those were ignored at

More often than not, however, judges are faced with foreign
normative facts that are open to reasonable debate. How judges should
then proceed will depend on whether the assistance of experts will be
needed. If experts are not necessary, ajudge who finds that the information
provided by the parties as to the contents of the relevant normative facts is
insufficient will have to seek out additional information on his or her own,
bearing in mind that the parties must always be given the opportunity to
comment on reasonably disputable information that may influence the
decision. However, determining the necessity of expert assistance is not
always an easy task. The next two sections will discuss when resort to
experts is in fact necessary and what a judge should do in those particular
circumstances.

33

And it may very well be that it is when their effect on the contents of the domestic
rules at issue
cannot be said to be beyond reasonable contestation. See supra note 25.
34The travaux preparatoireswere published, inter alia, in the United Nations
Commission on
InternationalTrade Law's Yearbook, a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. For a
detailed list of the travauxprdparatoires,see the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law Travaux Pripatoires,
online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org/english/travaux/arbitration/ml-arb/
travaux-ml-arb-index-e.htm >.
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Assessing the Need for ExpertAssistance

Resort to expert assistance will not always be needed because the
additional expenses and delays will only be justified when such assistance
is necessary, not when it is merely helpful. As the Supreme Court of Canada
made clear in R. v. Mohan,35 helpfulness-which is the relevant threshold
in the United States36 -sets too low a standard; the input of one or more
experts is only appropriate when the "subj ect-matter of the inquiry [is] such
that ordinary people are unlikely to form a correct judgment about it, if
unassisted by persons with special knowledge."37 In other words, when
ordinary people are likely to reach reasonably accurate results on their own,
experts should not be resorted to, even if their intervention could help
reduce the risk of reaching inaccurate conclusions. Necessity, or more
precisely the likelihood of necessity, is what matters.3 8
Whether this test is met will of course depend to a large extent on
the specific circumstances of each case. But while assessing the need to
resort to experts in the specific context of this article, two general
propositions ought to be considered. First, it would make little sense to
think in terms of the conclusions that could be drawn by ordinarypeople, as
suggested by the above-quoted extract from Mohan; law being a specialized
field, resort to expert knowledge would almost invariably be necessary. The
analysis must be contextualized and necessity must be thought of in terms
of what ordinary judges are likely or unlikely to accomplish without
35 [1994]
2 S.C.R. 9 [Mohan].
36
See also FederalRules ofEvidence, supra note 15 at rule 702. See also Strong, supra note 14, vol.
1 at 58: "[T]raditionally the subject of the inference must be so distinctively related to a science,
profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of lay persons. Some cases say that the judge
has discretion in administering this rule. Other cases admit expert opinion concerning matters about
which the jurors may have general knowledge if the expert opinion would still aid their understanding
of the issue. The latter standardis codified in FederalRule of Evidence and Revised Uniform Rule of
Evidence 702. In fact, Rule 702 seems to permit expert opinion even when the matter is within the jurors'
competence if specializedknowledge will be helpful, as it may be inparticularsituations."[Emphasis added.]
37 W.J. Byrne and A.D. Gibb, Beven on Negligence, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1928) at
141, cited in Kelliher (Village of) v. Smith, [1931] S.C.R. 672 at 684 and also cited in Mohan, supra note
35 at 23.
38
This point is often overlooked in connection with foreign rules applicable under a classic conflict
of laws scenario. Absent any agreement by the parties to the contrary, resort is very often made-at least
here in Canada-to the assistance of experts. But at times one is left with the impression that it could
hardly be said the trial judge was not likely to reach correct conclusions without the assistance of
experts. Can it really be said, e.g., that a Qu6bec judge sitting in Montr6al is unlikely to reach correct
conclusions on a point of French employment law absent expert assistance (see e.g. Desch~nesc. Nurun
Inc. (4 June 2003), Qu6bec 200-05-014316-009, (Qc. S.C.)), when thorough and up-to-date restatements
contained in the Juris-Classeurcan be found in or accessed freely from any Montr6al law library?
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resorting to expert assistance. Second, consideration must be given to the
fact that judges are themselves experts at legal interpretation, which
involves drawing conclusions from normative facts. Consequently, expert
assistance should normally be necessary only in connection with the
ascertainment of the foreign normative facts per se. Assistance should not
be extended to the related yet qualitatively different issue of which
conclusions ought to be drawn from those facts, unless the interpretation
of such facts requires an analysis that is so unintelligible to the ordinary
judge that he or she cannot be expected to reach accurate results on his or
her own. This situation, however, only seems likely in highly exceptional
39
cases.

One could also ask what role, if any, party autonomy should play in
determining whether experts are required. Due to the influence of the
adversarial model, which heavily emphasizes party autonomy in the control
and conduct of adjudication, judges should, as a general rule, uphold an
agreement of the parties requesting the intervention of one or several
experts. If no such agreement has been reached, however, judges should
raise proprio motu the issue of whether expert assistance will be needed,
seek the parties' views, and then decide whether they will likely reach
correct conclusions on the sole basis of readily available material and
literature. Ideally, judges should do this during the pre-trial phase or as
soon as they become aware of their obligation to consider foreign
normative facts that may influence the rules applicable to the case.
Furthermore, because judges must always remain in control in order to
uphold their fundamental duty to determine the contents of domestic rules,
they should never consider themselves bound by an agreement of the
parties that seeks to exclude expert assistance, a result that will likely occur
under a classic conflict of laws scenario.4"
To illustrate how necessity should be assessed consider, for
example, a motion seeking the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award filed with the British Columbia Supreme Court under the
ForeignArbitralAwardsAct," which implements the New York Convention.
Suppose that the motion is contested on the ground that the award has
been set aside by the courts of the jurisdiction in which it was made. It is
39Considere.g. the Supreme Court's statement relating to the
interpretation of international
conventional obligations in Thomson, supra note 5 at 577, to the effect that "[b]y and large, international
treaties are interpreted in a manner similar to [Canadian] statutes."
40 For a discussion of conflict of laws cases where the parties had implicitly or explicitly agreed to
exclude resort to expert witnesses and where courts determined the contents of foreign law on the sole
basis of foreign legal materials, see Fentiman, supra note 16 at 257-61.
41 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 154.
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not clear from the text of the Convention whether courts must or merely
may dismiss the motion under such circumstances. What is clear, though,
is that the judge would have a duty to take into account Canada's
international obligations under the Convention, which would mean a
consideration of the normative facts alluded to in articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.42 Given the voluminous and
overwhelming content of such normative facts, including the text of the
Convention's other five official versions 43 or case law emanating from the
132 other countries that are parties thereto, 44 initially, a judge may question
his or her ability to draw appropriate conclusions. However, after having
raised the issue with the parties and having surveyed the relevant literature,
the judge would probably realize that since the issue has generated such
interest worldwide, with several international commercial arbitration
45
experts have published extensive analyses directly on point, he or she
would be quite likely to draw reasonably accurate conclusions on his or her
own. No expert assistance would be required, but the judge would always
need to ensure that the parties be given the opportunity to comment on
information he or she may have retrieved that could, in turn, impact the
final decision.
This process may still lead to the result that the assistance of one or
is necessary. What should judges then do?
experts
more
B.

The Judge's Role in HandlingExpert Assistance

Because party autonomy occupies, for better and for worse, such a
prominent place in the model of adjudication that prevails throughout
Canada, resort to party-appointed experts will initially always be possible.
Consequently, judges should start by consulting the parties and enquire
about their intentions. The parties' initial preference will likely be to resort
to party-appointed experts rather than one or more court-appointed
experts.' Indeed, litigants in Canada, like in many common law
jurisdictions, very often resort to party-appointed experts to assist the court
in determining the contents of foreign rules under a classic conflict of laws
42 Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 6.
43 Ibid. at art. 33.
44 Supra note 6.
45 See interalia H.G. Gharavi, The InternationalEffectiveness oftheAnnulment of anArbitralAward
(The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) and the numerous references contained therein.
46 See e.g. supra note 9 at art. 414ff and the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
194, s. 52.03.
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scenario. They most often do so out of a need to retain as much control as

possible over the process and also out of a fear that judges may be unduly
influenced by court-appointed experts.47 They would likely perceive the

process of ascertaining foreign normative facts in a similar matter. But one
may wonder whether resorting to party-appointed experts would really be
desirable and what, if anything, a judge could do if he or she believes that
it would not.

A judge may seriously doubt the desirability of proceeding in this
manner because of a general reluctance toward instituting party-appointed
experts, a practice that has been widely and severely criticized by

commentators and judges for more than a century.48 Not only is resorting

to party-appointed experts very often the most expensive and most
complicated means by which adjudicators can acquire specialized
knowledge necessary to resolve a dispute, it is by no means obvious that the
presentation and confrontation of opposed theses really leads to more
accurate conclusions. Indeed, the proximity between party-appointed
experts and what are essentially their clients4 9 prevents adjudicators from
assuming that the conclusions reached are in fact objective and unbiased.
And, too often, cross-examination will simply reduce their usefulness rather
than introduce more accurate conclusions to the adjudicators."
47

See e.g. Fentiman,supra note 16 at 235. See also ibid. at 281: "[i]n English law neither the court
nor a party has ever apparently sought the appointment of an independent expert in disputes concerning
foreign law."
48 See e.g. Lord Woolf, Access to Justice - FinalReport of the Lord Chancelloron the Civil Justice
System in England and Wales (London: The Stationary Office, 1996) at 137; Strong, supra note 14 at 80;
G.C. Harris, "Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts" (2000) 28 Pepp. L. Rev.
1 at 39; Glenn R. Anderson, "Clear and Partial Danger: Defending Ourselves Against the Threat of
Expert Bias" (2004) 83 Can. Bar Rev. 285. Regarding resort to party-appointed experts to ascertain
information that influences legal rules, see J.H. Merryman, "Foreign Law as a Problem" (1983) 19 Stan.
J. Int'l L. 151.
49For a revealing practical account, see Steven Moss, "Opinions for Sale: Confessions of an
Expert Witness" Legal Affairs (March/April 2003) online: Legal Affairs: The Magazine at the
< http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/
of Law and Life
Intersection
March-April-2003/review marapr03_moss.html>. See also the English Court of Appeal's comments
inAbbey National v. Key Surveyors, [1996] 3 All E.R. 184 at 191 (C.A. (Civ. Div.)): "It was argued that
appointment of a court expert was pointless, since it merely meant the instruction of an additional
expert whose opinion would carry no more weight than any other. We feel bound to say that in our
opinion this argument ignores the experience of the courts over many years. Forwhatever reason, and
whether consciously or unconsciously, the fact is that expert witnesses instructed on behalf of parties to
litigationoften tend, if called as witnesses at all, to espouse the cause of those instructingthem to a greater
or lesser extent, on occasion becoming more partisan than the parties." [Emphasis added].
50 But for a more optimistic view of the contribution party-appointed experts can make in
connection with specialized information bearing upon the contents of domestic rule, see Baade, supra
note 15 at 641-42.
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A judge may also believe that a court-appointed expert may be
better-suited to the ascertainment of foreign normative facts because of the
strictly empirical nature of the task at hand.51 Indeed, because the expert's
mandate should usually be limited to ascertaining foreign normative facts, 2
the risks that he or she will fail to present to the court a broad enough
range of possible theories and conclusions-an argument often heard in
support of resorting to party-appointed experts- does not seem significant.
Many judges may thus envy their English colleagues, who were
recently granted the power to order that expert evidence sought to be
adduced by two or more parties be adduced by a single expert.53 Canadian
judges enjoy no such power, but this does not mean that they cannot,
whenever they feel that it would be appropriate, raise the possibility of
resorting to a court-appointed expert and discuss it with the parties during
the pre-trial phase. Some litigants may very well change their minds and
conclude that it would indeed make more sense to proceed in that manner.
Judges should always ensure, however, that parties who agree to the
intervention of a court-appointed expert also waive their rights to
subsequently adduce party-appointed expert testimony to rebut or defend
a conclusion reached by the court-appointed expert. Absent such an
undertaking, the process risks become even more costly and complex than
if party-appointed experts were employed.
If the parties are not willing to provide such an undertaking, a judge
who prefers not to resort to full-fledged, party-appointed expert testimony
could propose that the parties agree on excluding any oral examination of
the experts, whether in chief- or cross-examination. The expert's opinion
would thus be provided to the court through written statements, which
would not merely be prepared in fulfillment of a procedural condition to
the admissibility of subsequent testimony (as is normally the case), but
which would rather be treated by the court as actual testimony. This
51For the opinion of an American judge favourable to resorting to court-appointed
experts in
order to ascertain foreign law, see Roger J. Miner, "The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal
Courts" (1995) 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 581.
52 Thus excluding the issue of which conclusions ought to be drawn from such facts. On this
distinction, see supra note 12.
53 Rule 35.7 of the The Civil ProcedureRules 1998 (U.K.), S.I. 1998/3132 L.17
reads: "(1) Where
two or more parties wish to submit expert evidence on a particular issue, the court may direct that the
evidence on that issue is to given by one expert only. (2) The parties wishing to submit the expert
evidence are called 'the instructing parties'. (3) Where the instructing parties cannot agree who should
be the expert, the court may - (a) select the expert from a list prepared or identified by the instructing
parties; or (b) direct that the expert be selected in such other manner as the court may direct." On this
provision, see inter alia Lord Woolf C.J.'s reasons in Peet v. Mid-Kent Healthcare (2001), [2002] 3 All
E.R. 688 at 689-95 (C.A. (Civ. Div.)).
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solution may be particularly appealing to litigants who are ready to concede
that proceeding in the traditional manner is not desirable but who are not
willing to agree, for tactical reasons, on the appointment of a single expert.
Some judges who feel particularly strongly about the need for and
the effectiveness of cross-examination may, quite understandably, be
initially reluctant to proceed in this manner. They will find little comfort in
the fact that written statements prepared by party-appointed experts have
been used for decades in France to determine the contents of foreign rules
under a classic conflict of laws scenario,54 since cross-examination, at least
as it is known in the common law tradition, is unavailable in civil law
jurisdictions.55 However, they should give serious thought to the costeffectiveness of this method, which has been substantially demonstrated in
England, where it is routinely used to determine the contents of foreign
rules in interlocutory proceedings.5 6 Perhaps more importantly, this method
has been adopted in the United States, where "the use of affidavit evidence
without examination is [nowadays] commonplace" for all matters which
raise issues of foreign law, whether interlocutory or not.5 7 Surely, this
method would not have gained such support in the United States if the
opportunity to cross-examine experts who offer opinions on foreign
normative facts was in fact a necessary condition to the effectiveness of the
process.
If the parties are not willing to make concessions and insist on
proceeding through full-fledged party-appointed expert testimony, then so
shall it proceed. Will the process then resemble that followed when expert
opinion is sought on matters relating to adjudicative facts? Not quite,
because the judge's fundamental responsibility to determine the contents
of domestic rules58 significantly affects how he or she should react in
situations of uncertainty.
Where adjudicative facts are concerned, we do not expect from factfinders that they seek out additional information or otherwise cause
additional information to be adduced if, after the trial has ended, they are
unable to conclude on a balance of probabilities that a material fact has
54

See e.g. Audit, supra note 16 at 237ff. Establishing the contents of foreign rules through written
statements prepared by party-appointed experts has been expressly contemplated in the Civil Code of
Qudbec Art. 2809 C.C.O since 1994. However, litigants do not elect to proceed in this manner very
frequently.
55
On the examination of witnesses in the civil law tradition, see H. K6tz, "Civil Justice Systems
in
Europe and the United States" (2003) 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 61.
56 Fentiman, supra note 16 at 203ff.
57

Ibid. at 204, 279-80.

58 See supra note 7.
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either been proved or disproved. If the judge cannot conclude on a balance
of probabilities that the doctor was either negligent or not, this uncertainty
need not disappear before a decision can be made. We accept that
adjudication takes place in situations of uncertainty, as rules of a special
kind-relating to the burden of proof-operate to allocate risks between
the parties in such situations; the party bearing the burden of proof with
respect to a material fact that has neither been proved nor disproved on a
balance of probabilities will lose on that fact. As such, the rules relating to
the burden of proof operate to allocate risks between the parties in such
situations; the party bearing the burden of proof with respect to a material
fact that has neither been proved nor disproved on a balance of
probabilities will lose on that fact.59 Similarly, when uncertainty occurs in
connection with foreign rules applicable under a classic conflict of laws
scenario, no further enquiry is needed before adjudication can occur.60
Judges are simply expected to rule in accordance with domestic law.61
Adjudication should not be possible in cases of uncertainty

regarding foreign normative facts that bear upon the contents of domestic
rules because the judge's fundamental responsibility to determine the
contents of such rules entails that any uncertainty must be eliminated

before a decision can be made. If the judge is unable to draw sufficiently
accurate conclusions after specialized knowledge has been provided by the
parties' experts or the court-appointed experts, more must be done. In most
cases, the judge should be able to clarify matters by using his or her
59 This idea that the essential function of rules relating to the burden of proof is to
allocate risk
in situations where the fact-finder is unable to conclude, in light of the applicable standard of proof, that
a material fact has either been proved or disproved, is accepted in both the common law and the civil
law traditions. Compare, e.g., Hollis v. Dow Coming Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634 at 699 (Sopinka J.,
dissenting: "Only if the evidence were so evenly balanced that a determinate conclusion could not be
reached would resort to the legal burden of proof have been necessary.") and Caisse populaire de
Maniwaki v. Giroux, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 282 at 300 [Maniwaki] ("[t]he uncertainty and doubt which subsist
once evidence has been adduced must necessarily be resolved against the party which has the burden
of such proof"). As Professor Perrot notes in "La charge de lapreuve en mati~re d'assurance" (1961)
32 Rev. gdn. ass. terr.
5 at 7-8, cited in Maniwaki: "[T]he practical issue of how to assign the burden of
proof arises only in those situations where the process of weighing the evidence has produced no result.
Then and only then is it essential to resolve the problem ...
only if none of that evidence appears to the
judge to be decisive does he or she consider the issue of how to assign the burden of proof, so as to
decide which of the two parties will be believed on the basis of its mere assertion." On the possibility
that quite different standards of proof are applied in each tradition, see Kevin. M. Clermont & Emily
Sherwin, "A Comparative View of Standards of Proof" (2002) 50 Am. J.Comp. L. 243; M. Taruffo,
"Rethinking the Standards of Proof" (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 659.
60
Which is possible because public policy, as was mentioned, is not concerned with the application
of foreign rules. See supra note 6.
61 See Audit, supra note 16 at 244; G6rald Goldstein & Ethel Groffier, Droit internationalpriv6,
vol. 1. ("Th~orie g6n~rale") (Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 1998) at 234ff; Art. 2809 C.C.Q.
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common law powers to ask supplemental questions to witnesses, 62 which
could be resorted to irrespective of whether the experts were examined or
not. But only in those rare cases where even supplemental questioning by
the court will fail to eliminate the uncertainty, it seems that judges will have
no other choice but to appoint another expert who will be given the task of
providing them with whatever additional information is necessary.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The increased influence of foreign normative facts on domestic
legal orders is significantly changing how propositions we consider to
constitute valid law are formed. While it could probably be argued that
rules of legal interpretation were historically based on two fundamental
objectives-respect for the democratic principle and compliance with rules
that are reasonably certain and predictable-this is no longer true today.
Legal interpretation has inherited two more objectives: promoting
adherence to the rule of law in international relations and satisfying the
increasing need to harmonize certain categories of rules with those in force
elsewhere. Law is thus evolving in such a way that awareness of and
openness to foreign and transnational legal systems will become basic and
essential aspects of what constitutes thinking as ajurist.
But the increased influence of foreign normative facts on the
contents of domestic rules is also bound to have concrete repercussions on
a more practical level, and we ought to be thinking about those as well.
Three basic ideas underlie the analysis of the "proof' of such normative
facts proposed in this paper.
The first is that judges must always remain in control of the process
aimed at ascertaining these facts. They cannot remain passive and rule on
the sole basis of information that the parties have adduced, like they most
often do with respect to adjudicative facts or foreign rules under a classic
conflict of laws scenario. Because the interpretation of domestic rules is at
issue, they must adopt a more active role, one that will ensure that they will,
at the end of the process, have at their disposal sufficient information to
allow them to draw conclusions regarding the impugned foreign normative
facts. Second, judges must keep in mind that these facts will often be
reasonably disputable. When that is the case, compliance with theprincipe
du contradictoire is essential: the parties must always be afforded the
opportunity to comment on whatever information the court intends to rely
62 See generally R. v. Brouillard,[1985] 1 S.C.R. 39. In QuEbec, this power is codified in the Code
of Civil Procedure,supra note 9 at Art. 318: "The judge may ask the witness any question he deems
useful according to the rules of evidence."
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upon while ascertaining their contents. Finally, expert assistance may be
necessary to allow judges to draw accurate conclusions regarding foreign
normative facts. When that is the case, judges should bear in mind that
resorting to full-fledged, party-appointed testimony may not be desirable
because the input of a single expert or the use of written expert statements
may be sufficient and thus much more cost-effective. While, as things now
stand in Canada, they could not prevent the parties from resorting to fullfledged, party-appointed expert testimony, judges should, in appropriate
cases, ensure that the parties are at least aware of and have given thought
to these alternatives.

